Requirement for Consent

Allegiance and citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. Citizenship is the effect of compact [CONTRACT!]; allegiance is the offspring of power and necessity. Citizenship is a political tie; allegiance is a territorial tenure. Citizenship is the charter of equality; allegiance is a badge of inferiority. Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is personal. Citizenship is freedom; allegiance is servitude. Citizenship is communicable; allegiance is repulsive. Citizenship may be relinquished; allegiance is perpetual. With such essential differences, the doctrine of allegiance is inapplicable to a system of citizenship; which it can neither serve to controul, nor to elucidate. And yet, even among the nations, in which the law of allegiance is the most firmly established, the law most pertinaciously enforced, there are striking deviations that demonstrate the invincible power of truth, and the homage, which, under every modification of government, must be paid to the inherent rights of man….. The doctrine is, that allegiance cannot be due to two sovereigns; and taking an oath of allegiance to a new, is the strongest evidence of withdrawing allegiance from a previous, sovereign ….”

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[Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133 (1795); From the syllabus but not the opinion; SOURCE:

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http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.html?terms=choice%20or%20conflict%20and%20law&url=/s

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upct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0003_0133_ZS.html]

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14.3. These rules of presumption relating to domicile may only lawfully act in the absence of express declaration of 15 your domicile provided to the government in written form or when various sources of evidence conflict with each 16 other about your choice of domicile. 17

“This [government] right of domicile, he continues, is not established unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration . Vatt. Law Nat. pp. 92, 93.”

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[Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)]

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14.4. The purpose for these rules are basically to manufacture the “presumption” that courts can use to “ASSUME” or 21 “PRESUME” that you consented to their jurisdiction, even if in fact you did not explicitly do so. All such 22 prejudicial presumptions which might adversely affect your Constitutionally guaranteed rights are 23 unconstitutional, according to the U.S. Supreme Court: 24

1) [8:4993] Conclusive presumptions affecting protected interests:

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A conclusive presumption may be defeated where its application would impair a party's constitutionally- protected liberty or property interests. In such cases, conclusive presumptions have been held to violate a party's due process and equal protection rights. [ Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 449, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2235; Cleveland Bed. of Ed. v. LaFleur (1974) 414 U.S. 632, 639-640, 94 S.Ct. 1208, 1215-presumption under

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Illinois law that unmarried fathers are unfit violates process]

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[Federal Civil Trials and Evidence, Rutter Group, paragraph 8:4993, p. 8K-34]

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14.5. The purpose for these complicated rules of presumption is to avoid the real issue, which is whether you 32 voluntarily consent to the civil jurisdiction of the government and the courts in an area, because they cannot 33 proceed civilly without your express consent manifested as a voluntary choice of domicile. In most cases, if 34 litigants knew that all they had to do to avoid the jurisdiction of the court was to not voluntarily select a domicile 35 within the jurisdiction of the court, most people would become “transient foreigners” so the government could do 36 nothing other than just “leave them alone”. 37 15. You can choose a domicile any place you want. The only requirement is that you must ensure that the government or 38 sovereign who controls the place where you live has received “reasonable notice” of your choice of domicile and of 39 their corresponding obligation to protect you. 40

The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country for a special purpose and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel [in his book The Law of Nations as] "domicile," which he defines to be "a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there." Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of the inferior order from the native citizens, but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicile, he continues, is not established unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration . Vatt. Law Nat. pp. 92, 93. Grotius nowhere uses the word "domicile," but he also distinguishes between those who stay in a foreign country by the necessity of their affairs, or from any other temporary cause, and those who reside there from a permanent cause. The former he denominates "strangers," and the latter, "subjects." The rule is thus laid

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down by Sir Robert Phillimore:

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There is a class of persons which cannot be, strictly speaking, included in either of these denominations of naturalized or native citizens, namely, the class of those who have ceased to reside [maintain a domicile] in their native country, and have taken up a permanent abode in another. These are domiciled inhabitants. They have not put on a new citizenship through some formal mode enjoined by the law or the new country. They

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are de facto, though not de jure, citizens of the country of their [new chosen] domicile.

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Requirement for Consent

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

EXHIBIT:________