Requirement for Consent

The most obvious, and, as it seems to us, the most rational answer to this question is that Congress must have had in contemplation debts originating in contract or demands carried into judgment, and only debts of this character. This is the commonest and most natural use of the word. Some strain is felt upon the understanding when an attempt is made to extend it so as to include taxes imposed by legislative authority, and there should be

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no such strain in the interpretation of a law like this.

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We are the more ready to adopt this view because the greatest of English elementary writers upon law, when treating of debts in their various descriptions, gives no hint that taxes come within either, [Footnote 5] while American state courts of the highest authority have refused to treat liabilities for taxes as debts in the

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ordinary sense of that word, for which actions of debt may be maintained.

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The first of these cases was that of Pierce v. City of Boston, [Footnote 6] 1842, in which the defendant attempted to set off against a demand of the plaintiff certain taxes due to the city. The statute allowed mutual debts to be set off, but the court disallowed the right to set off taxes. This case went, indeed, upon the construction of the statute of Massachusetts, and did not turn on the precise point before us, but the language of the court shows that taxes were not regarded as debts within the common understanding of the word.

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The second case was that of Shaw v. Pickett, [Footnote 7] in which the Supreme Court of Vermont said,

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"The assessment of taxes does not create a debt that can be enforced by suit, or upon which a promise to pay

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interest can be implied. It is a proceeding in invitum. "

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The next case was that of the City of Camden v. Allen, [Footnote 8] 1857. That was an action of debt brought to recover a tax by the municipality to which it was due. The language of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was still more explicit: "A tax, in its essential characteristics," said the court, "is not a debt nor in the nature of a debt. A tax is an impost levied by authority of government upon its citizens or subjects for the support of the state. It is not founded on contract or agreement. It operates in invitum. A debt is a sum of money due by certain and express agreement. It originates in and is founded upon contracts express or implied."

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[Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 7 Wall. 71 71 (1868)]

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The U.S. Supreme Court is obviously schizophrenic, because they call income taxes “assumed debts” and yet contradict 25 themselves by saying that they are not “debts”. They disguise this contradiction by using Latin to disguise the phrase 26 “assumed debt” by calling it “indebtitatus assumpsit”. Earth calling the U.S. Supreme Court! Is anyone home upstairs? 27

There are MUCH bigger problems with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of taxes as “quasi contracts” or “assumed 28 debts” than that above. Under our Constitution, ALL are equal. We prove this in: 29

Requirement for Equal Protection and Equal Treatment , Form #05.033 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

“Taxes” are merely fees for government services. Hence, we have some HUGE questions and contradictions in our mind 30 presented by the U.S. Supreme Court ’s approach toward taxation. 31

1. How can the government perform a service for you without your express consent, call it a “benefit” even though you 32 regard it as an INJURY, create a bogus debt by merely UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PRESUMING it exists, and file 33 liens documenting the debt and yet NOT give you the SAME ability as an EQUAL to do the same thing when they 34 demand YOUR private property or services? 35 2. Don’t they need your consent to treat you UNEQUALLY? 36 3. If they don’t need your consent to treat you UNEQUALLY in relation to them, then why doesn’t the SAME 37 requirement apply EQUALLY toward them when you are enforcing an obligation AGAINST them for YOUR services 38 or property that were literally STOLEN by a simple and unconstitutional presumption that you OWED money without 39 even a written contract or evidence of consent of any kind? 40 4. Isn’t the fact that they are SUPERIOR and UNEQUAL toward you, and that they acquired that inequality without your 41 consent evidence that they have created an unconstitutional “Title of nobility”? 42 5. Doesn’t that unconstitutional “title of nobility” that judges created essentially by judicial fiat also make government 43 into a religion in which: 44 5.1. They have “supernatural powers”? 45 5.2. “Taxes” are the tithes? 46 5.3. The obligations they are enforcing amount to “worship” of that unconstitutional religion? 47 5.4. “Judges” are the priests? 48 5.5. Courts are the churches? 49 5.6. Attorneys are the deacons of the church? 50

Requirement for Consent

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

EXHIBIT:________