Requirement for Consent

vinculo matrimonii, in an action wherein he was served by publication, such divorce was valid. This judgment was rendered because the marriage contract between them was said to have been made with all the provisions of the laws of Connecticut pertaining to marriage, including divorce, which had become part, and parcel of such contract of marriage. And this was done and adjudged notwithstanding the state of South Carolina did not

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allow divorces. ”

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[Mccreery v. Davis, 44 S.C. 195, 28 L.R.A. 655, 22 S.E. 178, 51 Am. St. Rep. 794 (S.C., 1895)]

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To relate this analysis to taxation, the income tax is a franchise and excise tax upon public offices in the government. This 7 is covered in: 8

The “Trade or Business” Scam , Form #05.001 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

The predicate “status” of “taxpayer” requires the party to be a public officer, and that public office can ONLY be created by 9 the express CONSENT of both the government AND the volunteering officer. This is exhaustively proven in: 10

Why Your Government is Either a Thief or You are a “Public Officer” for Income Tax Purposes , Form #05.008 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm

You cannot unilaterally “elect” yourself into a public office by filling out a tax or other franchise form in order to volunteer 11 to BECOME a public officer. That would be the crime of impersonating a public officer under 18 U.S.C. §912 and many 12 other crimes. The office must exist and be LAWFULLY created under Title 5 of the United States Code BEFORE the 13 party can even lawfully BECOME a public officer and therefore a statutory “taxpayer”. Hence, “operation of law” cannot 14 be involved because consent of the officer to BECOME an officer is involved. Therefore, CONTRACT is the only method 15 for creating the income tax liability and that contract is a FRANCHISE contract or agreement. 16

“It is generally conceded that a franchise is the subject of a contract between the grantor and the grantee, and that it does in fact constitute a contract when the requisite element of a consideration is present. 27 Conversely, a franchise granted without consideration is not a contract binding upon the state, franchisee, or pseudo-

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franchisee. 28 “

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[36 American Jurisprudence 2d, Franchises, §6: As a Contract (1999)]

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The above analysis is why the U.S. Supreme Court calls the income tax a “quasi contract”. 22

“. . . still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a statutory liability, quasi contractual in nature, enforceable, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common-law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit. United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250 , 31 S.Ct. 155; Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 , 46 S.Ct. 180; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227; and see Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 542; Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 493. This was the rule established in the English courts before the Declaration of Independence. Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. 223; Attorney General v. Jewers and Batty, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. 225; Attorney General v. Hatton, Bunbury's Exch. Rep. [296 U.S. 268, 272] 262; Attorney General v. _ _, 2 Ans.Rep. 558; see Comyn's Digest (Title 'Dett,' A, 9); 1 Chitty on Pleading, 123; cf.

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Attorney General v. Sewell, 4 M.&W. 77. “ [Milwaukee v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935)]

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Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court contradicts itself in the above by calling the obligation “indebtitatus assumpsit”, 35 meaning an ASSUMED debt. Why? Because they also held earlier that “taxes” are NOT debts! 36

27 Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 73 L.Ed. 441, 49 S.Ct. 196; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 57 L.Ed. 633, 33 S.Ct. 303; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 50 L.Ed. 801, 26 S.Ct. 427; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Brown, 176 Ark. 774, 4 S.W.2d. 15, 58 A.L.R. 534; Chicago General R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 Ill. 253, 52 N.E. 880; Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 149 Ky. 234, 148 S.W. 13; State ex rel. Kansas City v. East Fifth Street R. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 41 S.W. 955; Baker v. Montana Petroleum Co., 99 Mont. 465, 44 P.2d. 735; Re Board of Fire Comrs. 27 N.J. 192, 142 A.2d. 85; Chrysler Light & P. Co. v. Belfield, 58 N.D. 33, 224 N.W. 871, 63 A.L.R. 1337; Franklin County v. Public Utilities Com., 107 Ohio.St. 442, 140 N.E. 87, 30 A.L.R. 429; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537; Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 A. 635; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 469, 99 S.E. 723, 9 A.L.R. 1148, cert den 251 U.S. 557, 64 L.Ed. 413, 40 S.Ct. 179, disapproved on other grounds Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & Power Co. 134 Va. 134, 114 S.E. 92, 28 A.L.R. 562, and disapproved on other grounds Richmond v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 141 Va. 69, 126 S.E. 353.

28 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bowers, 124 Pa. 183, 16 A. 836.

Requirement for Consent

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

EXHIBIT:________