Requirement for Consent
To implement these principles, courts must consider from time to time where the governmental sphere [e.g. “public purpose” and “public office”] ends and the private sphere begins. Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints. This is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the "essential dichotomy" between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant
1
2
3
4
5
6
constitutional obligations. Moose Lodge, supra, at 172.“
7
[. . .]
8
Given that the statutory authorization for the challenges exercised in this case is clear, the remainder of our state action analysis centers around the second part of the Lugar test, whether a private litigant, in all fairness, must be deemed a government actor in the use of peremptory challenges. Although we have recognized that this aspect of the analysis is often a fact-bound inquiry, see Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939, our cases disclose certain principles of general application. Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following:
9
10
11
12
13
14
[1] the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
15
16
715 (1961) ;
17
[2] whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
18
19
Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987);
20
[3] and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority, see
21
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
22
Based on our application of these three principles to the circumstances here, we hold that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defendant in the District Court was pursuant to a course of state action.
23
24
[Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991)]
25
Note that the "statutory or decisional law" they are referring to above are ONLY. 26
1.
Criminal law.
27
2. Franchises that you consensually engage in using your right to contract. 28
For an explanation of why this is, see:
29
Why Statutory Civil Law is Law for Government and Not Private Persons , Form #05.037 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
If you want an exhaustive analysis of how franchises such as the Internal Revenue Code Subtitles A through C operate, 30 please see the following: 31
Government Instituted Slavery Using Franchises , Form #05.030 http://sedm.org/Forms/FormIndex.htm
10.5.1
Summary of the effects of franchises
32
Nearly every type of government-issued “ benefit ” , license, or "privilege" you could possibly procure requires the 33 participant to be a "public officer", "public official", "fiduciary", "alien", "resident", 'transferee", or "trustee" of the 34 government of one kind or another with a "residence" on federal territory. 35
“All the powers of the government [ including ALL of its civil enforcement powers against the public] must be carried into operation by individual agency, either through the medium of public officers, or contracts made
36
37
with [private] individuals. ”
38
[Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824)]
39
The application or license to procure the "benefits" of the franchise constitutes the contract mentioned above that creates 40 the "RES" which is "IDENT-ified" within the government's legislative jurisdiction on federal territory. Hence "RES- 41 IDENT"/"resident". 42
Requirement for Consent
252 of 396
Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013
EXHIBIT:________
Made with FlippingBook - Share PDF online