Requirement for Consent

those who receive the benefit to abuse their voting power to compel the government to STEAL from their fellow working 1 citizens, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §597, which IS positive law, by the way. 2

6.3

“Consent” v. “Agreement”

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The relationship between “consent” and “agreement” is very important and will be treated in depth within this section. 4 These two words are NOT synonymous. Consent is always an agreement and concurrence of the wills between two or 5 more parties. Consent actively seeks the proposed thing to happen. Not all agreements, however, are a concurrence of 6 wills. An agreement entered into in the presence of duress is an example where consent is lacking. Understanding this 7 concept becomes very important in a legal context in cases involving government enforcement actions such as willful 8 failure to file a tax return. 9 It would be a contradiction to say that you could consent under duress. No one wills something they are forced into 10 accepting. It would be a contradiction to say that you could consent to fraud. There can be no concurrence of wills when 11 one party is agreeing to something different than is represented (e.g. words of art). Fraud and duress may produce 12 agreement, but they can never produce consent. And the Declaration of Independence requires your consent when the 13 government acts. 14

Agreements also are not “law” in a classical sense, which is why they are classified instead as “compacts” and private law. 15

Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme

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power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."

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[. . .]

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It is also called a rule to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us . The language of a compact is, "I will, or will not, do this"; that of a law is, "thou shalt, or shalt not, do it." It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conscience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws. we are obliged to act without ourselves determining or promising anything at all. Upon these accounts law is defined to be "a

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rule."

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[Readings on the History and System of the Common Law, Second Edition, Roscoe Pound, 1925, p. 4]

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That is why the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitles A through C are not “law” in a classical sense, for instance, but 27 technically are a franchise, and all franchises are compacts, contracts, or agreements of one sort or another. 28

“ It is generally conceded that a franchise is the subject of a contract between the grantor and the grantee, and that it does in fact constitute a contract when the requisite element of a consideration is present. 12 Conversely, a franchise granted without consideration is not a contract binding upon the state, franchisee, or

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pseudo-franchisee. 13 “

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[36 American Jurisprudence 2d, Franchises, §6: As a Contract (1999)]

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Not all agreements can truthfully be characterized as legal evidence of consent. Agreements can take the following forms, 34 some of which are evidence of consent, and some of which are not: 35

1.

Express consent:

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1.1. Vocal agreement. This is called a “parole contract”. 1.2. In writing. For instance, a written contract.

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2.

Implied consent:

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12 Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 73 L.Ed. 441, 49 S.Ct. 196; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 57 L.Ed. 633, 33 S.Ct. 303; Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 50 L.Ed. 801, 26 S.Ct. 427; Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Brown, 176 Ark. 774, 4 S.W.2d. 15, 58 A.L.R. 534; Chicago General R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 Ill. 253, 52 N.E. 880; Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 149 Ky. 234, 148 S.W. 13; State ex rel. Kansas City v. East Fifth Street R. Co., 140 Mo. 539, 41 S.W. 955; Baker v. Montana Petroleum Co., 99 Mont. 465, 44 P.2d. 735; Re Board of Fire Comrs. 27 N.J. 192, 142 A.2d. 85; Chrysler Light & P. Co. v. Belfield, 58 N.D. 33, 224 N.W. 871, 63 A.L.R. 1337; Franklin County v. Public Utilities Com., 107 Ohio.St. 442, 140 N.E. 87, 30 A.L.R. 429; State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537; Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 A. 635; Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 469, 99 S.E. 723, 9 A.L.R. 1148, cert den 251 U.S. 557, 64 L.Ed. 413, 40 S.Ct. 179, disapproved on other grounds Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & Power Co. 134 Va 134, 114 S.E. 92, 28 A.L.R. 562, and disapproved on other grounds Richmond v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 141 Va. 69, 126 S.E. 353.

13 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bowers, 124 Pa. 183, 16 A. 836.

Requirement for Consent

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

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