The Encyclopedia of World Religions

fundamentalism, Islamic S 167

damentalism. Since the 1920s Turkey had been the most secular state in the Islamic world, but by the end of the century a powerful political party, the Refah party, advocated a return to Islamic practices. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood found many supporters, as did the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan. Islamic fundamentalism has been par ticularly strong among Western-educated profes sionals such as doctors and engineers, so in addi tion to stressing the observance of Islamic prac tices, these organizations have often been active in furthering health, education, and welfare. In addition, political leaders like Mu‘ammar Gad hafi (b. 1942) of Libya (technically a socialist), Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Zia ul-Haq (1924–88) of Pakistan, and Jafar al-Numayri (b. 1930) of the Sudan attempted to attract support by appealing to Islam. Perhaps the most ruthless governmental attempt to implement Islamic policies was that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some Muslim fundamentalists, the ones most familiar in the United States, have gone further. They have embraced violence, just as some Chris tian fundamentalists have. They see themselves as engaged in a war with Western powers, Z IONISM , and the governments of what they see as nominally Islamic states. Because these governments fail to observe Shariah in all spheres of life, they have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the extreme funda mentalists, who feel that such governments should be overthrown. An early example was the assas sination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. He had become unpopular not only for backing the separation of religion and politics in 1979 but also for the dicta torial character of his rule. It is important not to overlook the violence in which such groups engage. Well-known exam ples include the suicide bombings sponsored by H AMAS in Palestine, which is anti-Israeli but not anti-Western, and the attacks against the U.S. and its allies by AL -Q AEDA . These groups derive part of their appeal by acting on deep frustrations that many Muslims feel. But groups like Hamas also derive their support from efforts that they share with more moderate Muslim fundamentalists: charitable work for the betterment of society and

struggling to protect it. That struggle is known in Arabic as JIHAD . Despite the notion common in North America that jihad means “holy war,” most fundamental ist Muslims do not see themselves as called upon to take up arms. Instead, they see themselves as called to observe the traditions of Islam and to encourage others to do so. They also feel called upon to improve society through charitable orga nizations. (Such compassion for others is a major feature of Islamic teachings.) They deplore gov ernmental corruption and seek governments that are responsible in their use of money and treat ment of people. Further, they oppose changes in values and lifestyles that they see as going against God’s will. One area where they—and others as well—see these changes occurring is in sexuality and gender roles. Fundamentalist Muslims stress modesty for women, often symbolized by wearing a hijab or head-covering. In the late 1990s they worked together with the Roman Catholic Church in opposing some of the changes to traditional society favored by feminists ( see FEMINISM ). Since the 1970s Islamic fundamentalism has been growing at a tremendous rate in states where Mus lims constitute the majority of the population. Two early events in particular provided inspiration. The first was the performance of the Egyptian military in the 1973 war with Israel. Anwar Sadat (1918– 1981), the President of Egypt, had presented the war as a challenge for Islam; the results seemed to confirm that the future lay in returning to Islam. Then, in 1979, the people of Iran overthrew the Shah, whose Westernizing government had been increasingly corrupt. In actuality, Iranians with many different political and religious convictions, liberals as well as conservatives, brought about the revolution. The establishment of Iran as an Islamic republic, however, and the rise to dominance of the Ayatollah K HOMEINI left liberals frustrated and gave hope to Muslim fundamentalists worldwide. By the end of the 20th century, many Islamic states had experienced the effects of Islamic fun ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISLAMIC STATES