The Encyclopedia of World Religions

144 S faith

ing. Therefore, even reason requires some kind of faith, namely, faith in the propositions from which it begins. A medieval Christian theologian, A NSELM of Canterbury ( c. 1033–1109), summarized this view with the phrase credo ut intelligam, “I believe, in order that I may understand.” A third position is possible. This is the posi tion that faith and reason belong to two different domains. In this view the question of faith and reason mistakenly adopts an “intellectualist” view of faith. It sees the content of faith as a series of propositions about which reason can pass judg ment. In a different view of faith—for example, if faith is seen as an attitude of trust—the question may disappear. Others, however, find this position too simple. Faith may be an attitude of trust in God, but that attitude entails holding to some claims, like the claim that God exists. Some who take this view find a tension between faith and reason. Indeed, they celebrate the tension and urge religious peo ple to have faith despite the absurdity of what one believes or even, in extreme cases, because of the absurdity. WHERE DOES FAITH COME FROM? Faith may be derived in various ways. Inner psy chological dynamics may push a person toward one or another religious system. It may come out of experience, whether of a mystical or conver sion sort, or just an experience of life problems that point toward a certain religion as the answer. W ORSHIP and living in a “community of faith” can incline a person to want to share in that faith and make it his or her own. According to the Q UR ’ AN , as well as many Christians, faith is a gift of God. For others, faith requires at some point making a “leap” and affirm ing things beyond reason and sight alone. A faith commitment thus becomes a choice freely and fully given. Some would say making such a choice about one’s life is the whole point of faith, as it is of religion. Further reading: James W. Fowler, Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development (San

Many Protestant theologians stress that faith is not so much saying one believes certain “propo sitions” but rather an attitude of dependence and trust in God, especially as revealed in C HRIST . It is therefore an inward attitude and perhaps emotional disposition as much as an intellectual framework, though it may include the latter. A similar kind of faith seems to be found in H INDUISM , for example, when K RISHNA tells Arjuna toward the end of the B HAGAVAD -G ITA , “Abandon all D HARMA ; trust only in me; I will free you from all evils; do not fear” (18.66). Consider, too, the trust that some adher ents of P URE L AND B UDDHISM place in the “original vow” of the B UDDHA A MIDA and that followers of N ICHIREN have in the L OTUS S UTRA or simply in the power of chanting the praise of the Lotus Sutra in the phrase “Nam Myoho Renge Kyo.” Some believe that faith excludes doubt, but not all agree. The theologian Paul Tillich (1886–1965) regarded faith as an openness toward an ultimate reality wholly beyond one’s understanding. For him, even honest doubt was a form of faith. Some modern Buddhist teachers have presented faith as simply a willingness to take, say, the Buddha’s FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS as a “working hypothesis,” the final truth or falsity of which will be determined not in theory but in practice. FAITH AND REASON Philosophers, especially Western philosophers influenced by Christianity, have often pondered the relation of faith and reason. They have not come to any agreement. One position suggests that faith completes rea son. This view was popular with medieval thinkers such as Thomas A QUINAS . Some truths, these think ers believe, can be established by reason, such as the existence of God, but that is not all the truth there is. Faith completes reason with the views that, for example, God is a TRINITY and J ESUS was God. Another position asserts just the opposite view, that faith comes not after but before reason. That is, all reasoning starts from assumptions, propositions that the reasoner assumes to be true. Without those assumptions, reasons can do noth