The Encyclopedia of World Religions

92 S church and state

compensation, and the court ruled in her favor ( Sherbert v. Verner ). Twenty-seven years later, in 1990, the court took a much narrower view of religious freedom. It said that religious freedom did not allow people to violate laws that applied to everyone. It only prevented the government from outlawing specific religious prac tices. The case at issue involved two Native American drug counselors. They lost their jobs because they had eaten peyote, an hallucinogen, in ceremonies of the Native American Church. (Their jobs required them to remain drug-free.) They, too, wanted unem ployment compensation, but the court denied their request ( Employment Division v. Smith ). The narrow view of religious freedom does offer religious people some protection. For exam ple, in 1993 the Supreme Court ruled that a Florida town could not pass a law against animal sacrifice ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah ). But many people felt that the narrow view did not pro vide enough protection. For example, what would prevent a state from convicting priests of serving alcohol to minors when they gave the E UCHARIST to teenagers? A state that convicted priests could claim that it was simply enforcing a law everyone had to follow. Concerns such as these led Congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993. In line with the broader view of religious freedom, it required governments to demonstrate a compel ling interest before they violated religious freedom. But in July 1996 the court declared this act uncon stitutional, because Congress cannot tell the courts how to interpret the Constitution. At the time of writing, amendments to the First Amendment have been proposed in Congress, but it seems unlikely that any new constitutional amendments on reli gion will be ratified. Further reading: Sidney Z. Ehler, and John B. Morrall, Church and State Through the Centuries (London: Burns and Oates, 1954); Edwin S. Gaustad, Church and State in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); William Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic. (New York: Knopf, 1986).

In 1791 the Bill of Rights added 10 amend ments to the Constitution. Two clauses of the First Amendment deal with religion. The first says that Congress cannot pass a law that tends to establish religion—not a religion, but religion in general. This clause is known as the Establishment Clause. The second clause says that Congress cannot pro hibit people from practicing their religion freely. It is known as the Free Exercise Clause. The Four teenth Amendment, passed later during the Civil War, prohibited state and local governments from taking away rights granted at the federal level. As a result, the First Amendment now applies at all levels of government, from the federal government to school boards. During the second half of the 20th century, many disputes arose concerning the interpreta tion of two religion clauses. In applying the Estab lishment Clause, the Supreme Court ruled that governments could neither promote nor inhibit religion. As a result, it declared unconstitutional many practices common in some public schools. For example, in 1962 the court ruled that schools cannot write prayers and have students recite them ( Engel v. Vitale ). Later, in 1985, the court also held that states cannot require public school students to observe a moment of silent meditation ( Wallace v. Jaffree ). According to a 1992 ruling, a religious official, whether priest, minister, RABBI , or IMAM , cannot offer prayers at public school functions ( Lee v. Weisman ). Controversies also arose over the Free Exercise Clause. That clause clearly has its limits. People cannot simply do anything they want in the name of religious freedom. For example, no one suggests that human SACRIFICE should be legal. But where should the lines be drawn? In 1963 the court took a broad view of religious freedom. It said that if the government wanted to deprive someone of religious freedom, it had to do more than simply give a reason. It had to show that a “compelling interest” left it no choice but to violate religious freedom. The 1963 case involved a Seventh-Day Adventist ( see S EVENTH -D AY A DVENT ISM ) who had lost her job because she could not work on Saturdays. She wanted unemployment