Roman Law and the Legal World of the Romans

Roman Law and the Legal World of the Romans

For instance, both the initial summons to court and the execu tion of any eventual judgment required either cooperation by the defendant or some direct application of force by the plain tiff. In the face of an uncooperative defendant, the plaintiff did have some options. More powerful allies might be brought in, whether because of social ties or potential profit. The praetor could impose disgrace or hand out a default judgment (the lat ter itself needing enforcement). Still, these options might not always be available, and a more powerful party would not need to rely on them in the first place. Even during a trial, the state’s hands-off attitude might be relevant. Neither side could legally compel witnesses to testify, nor were there rules against tam pering (except by outright bribery). A substantially wealthier or more powerful party would presumably have had a real advantage in attracting witnesses (or in discouraging the other side’s witnesses from appearing), even short of paying them. That possibility leads to a final advantage for the wealthy: bribery. While this was not legal during any period, and became a criminal offense during the late Republic, it may have been common. Accusations of bribery are common in par ticular cases, but admissions are vanishingly rare (even from positions of relative safety), so it is hard to tell whether most of these supposed instances are just sour grapes. Our credence in these particular cases might be increased by the fact that “money” along with “favoritism” and “power” is one of the stereotypical sources of corruption in political institutions in general, including in the courts. On the other hand, one might argue that the same “myth” could justify both the general and

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