Requirement for Consent

President, despite Presidents' approval of hundreds of statutes containing a legislative veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the "consent" of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.

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State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, the facts of this case raise the possibility that powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want sites near their homes. As a result, while it would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If [505 U.S. 144, 183] a federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives - choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a location - the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the

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direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced. "

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[New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)]

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3. Parties domiciled in states of the Union may not consent to the jurisdiction of the federal courts where no subject 18 matter jurisdiction exists within the Constitution, because it would unlawfully enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal 19 government beyond the clear boundaries enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. 20

Pacemaker argues that in the federal system a party may not consent to jurisdiction, so that the parties cannot waive their rights under Article III. The maxim that parties may not consent to the jurisdiction of federal courts is not applicable here. The rule is irrelevant because it applies only where the parties attempt to confer upon an Article III court a subject matter jurisdiction that Congress or the Constitution forbid. See, e.g., Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Peters), 148, 148-49, 8 L.Ed. 898 (1834); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 28 L.Ed. 462, 4 S.Ct. 510 (1884). The limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the need to respect the boundaries of federalism underlie the rule. In the instant case, however, the subject matter, patents, is exclusively one of federal law. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that Congress may "confer upon federal courts jurisdiction conditioned upon a defendant's consent." Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 652, 91 L.Ed. 1718, 67 S.Ct. 1443 (1947); see Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160, 83 L.Ed. 100, 59 S.Ct. 131 (1938). The litigant waiver in this case is similar to waiver of a defect in jurisdiction over the person, a waiver federal courts permit. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343, 4 L.Ed.2d. 1254, 80 S.Ct. 1084

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(1960).

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[Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America Inc. v. Instromedix Inc., 725 F.2d. 537 (9th Cir. 02/16/1984)]

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The best descriptions of federalism are found in presidential executive orders. Below is an example: 35

Executive Order 12612--Federalism

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Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12612 of Oct. 26, 1987, appear at 52 F.R. 41685, 3 C.F.R., 1987

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Comp., p. 252, unless otherwise noted.

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By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and in order to restore the division of governmental responsibilities between the national government and the States that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution and to ensure that the principles of federalism established by the Framers guide the Executive departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of

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policies, it is hereby ordered as follows:

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Section 1. Definitions. For purposes of this Order:

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(a) "Policies that have federalism implications" refers to regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

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responsibilities among the various levels of government.

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(b) "State" or "States" refer to the States of the United States of America, individually or collectively, and, where relevant, to State governments, including units of local government and other political subdivisions

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established by the States.

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Sec. 2. Fundamental Federalism Principles. In formulating and implementing policies that have federalism implications, Executive departments and agencies shall be guided by the following fundamental federalism

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principles:

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(a) Federalism is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best assured by limiting the size and

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scope of the national government.

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(b) The people of the States created the national government when they delegated to it those enumerated governmental powers relating to matters beyond the competence of the individual States. All other

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Requirement for Consent

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

EXHIBIT:________