Requirement for Consent

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"To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v. [505 U.S. 144, 182] Ashcroft, 501 U.S., at 458 . See The Federalist No. 51, p. Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached- upon branch approves the encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 -137 (1976), for instance, the Court held that Congress had infringed the President's appointment power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 842 , n. 12. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 -959 (1983), we held that the legislative veto violated the constitutional requirement that legislation be presented to the President, despite Presidents' approval of hundreds of statutes containing a legislative veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the "consent" of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States. State officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Indeed, the facts of this case raise the possibility that powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want sites near their homes. As a result, while it would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If [505 U.S. 144, 183] a federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives - choosing a location or having Congress direct the choice of a location - the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of personal responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the 323. (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced. "

[New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)]

The only persons within the government who can bind the government are “public officials” acting under the authority of 35 law. These officials exercise broad discretion in the execution of the “public trusts” under their stewardship as elected or 36 appointed officials of the U.S. government: 37

“ As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. 60 Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts . 61 That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves. 62 and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. 63 It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official which individual. 64

60 State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, 98 Mont. 425, 40 P.2d. 995, 99 A.L.R. 321; Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d. 8.

61 Georgia Dep’t of Human Resour ces v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d. 524. A public official is held in public trust. Madlener v. Finley (1st Dist), 161 Ill.App.3d. 796, 113 Ill.Dec. 712, 515 N.E.2d. 697, app gr 117 Ill.Dec. 226, 520 N.E.2d. 387 and revd on other grounds 128 Ill.2d. 147, 131 Ill.Dec. 145, 538 N.E.2d. 520. 62 Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d. 555, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d. 181, appeal after remand (1st Dist) 107 Ill.App.3d. 222, 63 Ill.Dec. 134, 437 N.E.2d. 783. 63 United States v. Holzer (CA7 Ill), 816 F.2d. 304 and vacated, remanded on other grounds 484 U.S. 807, 98 L.Ed.2d. 18, 108 S.Ct. 53, on remand (CA7 Ill) 840 F.2d. 1343, cert den 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed.2d. 608, 108 S.Ct. 2022 and (criticized on other grounds by United States v. Osser (CA3 Pa) 864 F.2d. 1056) and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Little (CA5 Miss) 889 F.2d. 1367) and (among conflicting authorities on other grounds noted in United States v. Boylan (CA1 Mass) 898 F.2d. 230, 29 Fed.Rules.Evid.Serv. 1223). 64 Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill.2d. 559, 2 Ill.Dec. 285, 357 N.E.2d. 452, later proceeding (1st Dist) 105 Ill.App.3d. 298, 61 Ill.Dec. 172, 434 N.E.2d. 325.

Requirement for Consent

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