Requirement for Consent

principle by paying the interest with one hand, and taking back the amount of the tax with the other. But to this the answer is, that, to comply truly with the rule, the tax must be upon all the money of the community, not upon the particular portion of it which is paid to the public creditors, and it ought besides to be so regulated as not to include a lien of the tax upon the fund. The creditor should be no otherwise acted upon than as every other possessor of money; and, consequently, the money he receives from the public can then only be a fit subject of taxation when it is entirely separated' (from the contract), 'and thrown undistinguished into the common mass.' 3 Hamilton, Works, 514 et seq. Thus only can contracts with the State be allowed to have the same meaning as all Moreover, if the dissent were correct that the sovereign acts doctrine permits the Government to abrogate its contractual commitments in "regulatory" cases even where it simply sought to avoid contracts it had come to regret, then the Government's sovereign contracting power would be of very little use in this broad sphere of public activity. We rejected a virtually identical argument in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), in which Congress had passed a resolution regulating the payment of obligations in gold. We held that the law could not be applied to the Government's own obligations, noting that "the right to make binding obligations See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ("` The United States does business on business terms '") (quoting United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)); Perry v. United States, supra at 352 (1935) (" When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference . . . except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent ") (citation omitted); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1877) (" The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf "); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) ( explaining that when the United States "comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals See Jones, 1 Cl.Ct. at 85 (" Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed defendant "); O'Neill v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine applies where, "[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other party for the governing action"). The dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from Jones, from which case Horowitz drew its reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, post at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not emphasize is a competence attaching to sovereignty. " Id. at 353. there "). other similar contracts have. [Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1877)] _________________________________________________________________________________________

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same as a private party.

36

[United States v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839 (1996)]

37

How does the government abuse sovereign immunity to protect PRIVATE business activities? Let’s use the Internal 38 Revenue Code, for example, which we now know is “private law”: 39

1. The Internal Revenue Code is identified as a “code” and not a “law” in 1 U.S.C. §204. In fact, it is a “code” of 40 repealed laws. 53 Stat. 1 REPEALED the entire Internal Revenue Code, leaving no “law” left to enforce. 41 2. No court ruling we have ever read at the supreme court or district court level acknowledges whether the Internal 42 Revenue Code is either “private law” or “public law”. This is deliberate, because they want to perpetuate the FRAUD 43 and FALSE PRESUMPTION in the minds of the American public and the legal profession that it is “public law” that 44 applies to everyone. 45 3. Those who claim to be “nontaxpayers” not subject to the private law that is the Internal Revenue Code preserve all 46 their constitutional rights and are free to challenge the constitutionality of the enforcement of any provision of this 47 “code” against them in any court of law. 48

"The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law. With them Congress does not

49

50

51

assume to deal, and they are neither of the subject nor of the object of the revenue laws..."

52

[Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236 (1922)]

53

“Revenue Laws relate to taxpayers [instrumentalities, officers, employees, and elected officials of the national but not federal Government] and not to non-taxpayers [American Citizens/American Nationals not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government]. The latter are without their scope. No procedures are prescribed for non-taxpayers and no attempt is made to annul any of their Rights or Remedies in due course of

54

55

56

57

Requirement for Consent

245 of 396

Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

EXHIBIT:________