Requirement for Consent

This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority: when they cease

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to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible.

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In my earlier demonstration of how particular wills are substituted for the general will in public deliberation, I have adequately pointed out the practicable methods of avoiding this abuse; and I shall have more to say of them later on. I have also given the principles for determining the proportional number of votes for declaring that will. A difference of one vote destroys equality; a single opponent destroys unanimity; but between equality and unanimity, there are several grades of unequal division, at each of which this proportion may be fixed in

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accordance with the condition and the needs of the body politic.

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There are two general rules that may serve to regulate this relation. First, the more grave and important the questions discussed, the nearer should the opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity. Secondly, the more the matter in hand calls for speed, the smaller the prescribed difference in the numbers of votes may be allowed to become: where an instant decision has to be reached, a majority of one vote should be enough. The first of these two rules seems more in harmony with the laws, and the second with practical affairs. In any case, it is the combination of them that gives the best proportions for determining the majority necessary. [ The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right , Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1762, Book IV, Chapter 2]

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Note how Rousseau describes those who are not party to the social contract as “foreigners”: 16

“ If then there are opponents when the social compact is made, their opposition does not invalidate the contract, but merely prevents them from being included in it. They are foreigners among citizens. When the State is instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the Sovereign. “

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We also clarify the following about Rousseau’s comments above: 20

1. Those who are parties to the social compact are called “citizens” if they were born in the country and “residents” if 21 they were born in a foreign country, who together are called “inhabitants” or “domiciliaries” . 22 2. The “foreigner” he is talking about is either a statutory “alien” (foreign national), a “nonresident”, or a “non -resident 23 non- person” in the case of a state domiciled state national. 24 3. When Rousseau says “ Apart from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. ” , 25 what he means by “the rest” is “the rest of the inhabitants, citizens, or residents”, but NOT “nonresidents” or “transient 26 foreigners” . This is implied by his other statement: “ If then there are opponents when the social compact is made, 27 their opposition does not invalidate the contract, but merely prevents them from being included in it. They are 28 foreigners among citizens. ” 29 4. Rousseau says that: “ When the State is instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to 30 submit to the Sovereign .” Here are some key points about this statement: 31 4.1. What he means by “residence” is a political and voluntary act of association and consent, and NOT physical 32 presence in a specific place. 33 4.2. Those who have made this choice of “residence” and thereby politically associated with and joined with a specific 34 political “state” acquire the status under the social contract called “resident” or “citizen”. Those who have not 35 associated are called “transient foreigners”, “strangers”, or “in transitu”. 36 4.3. The choice of “residence” is protected by the First Amendment right of association and freedom from compelled 37 association. Those who are humans physically on land protected by the Constitution cannot lawfully be 38 FORCED to acquire any civil status under the civil statutes of any government, INCLUDING “resident” or 39 “residence” . Note that this prohibition does not affect artificial entities or fictions of law, such as businesses or 40 especially corporations. 41 5. All rights under the social contract attach to the statuses under the contract called “citizen”, “resident”, “ inhabitant ”, or 42 “domiciliary”. In that sense, the contract behaves as a franchise or what we call a “pr otection franchise”. You are not 43 protected by the franchise unless you procure a civil status under the franchise called “citizen” or “resident”. 44 6. In a legal sense, to say that one is “in the state” or “dwelling in the state” really means that: 45 6.1. A human being has consented to the social contract and thereby become a “government contractor”. 46 6.2. Consent creates the “res” or legal fiction called “person” within the civil statutory codes/franchises. 47 6.3. The legal fiction of “person” created by your consent is an officer or public officer within the government 48 corporation. The U.S. Supreme Court associates two civil statuses to all governments: 1. “ Body corporate ” ; 2. 49 Body politic. 33 50 33 “ Both before and after the time when the Dictionary Act and § 1983 were passed, the phrase “ bodies politic and corporate ” was understood to include the [governments of the] States . See, e.g., J. Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America 185 (11th ed. 1866); W. Shumaker & G. Longsdorf, Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law 104 (1901); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) (Iredell, J.); id., at 468 (Cushing, J.); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231, 13 L.Ed. 675 (1851) (“ Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person ”); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288, 5 S.Ct. 903, 29 L.Ed. 185 (1885); McPherson v. Blacker,

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

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