Requirement for Consent

1.1. Injury: There must be an injury against your rights or property as the Plaintiff. The injury in fact is concrete and 1 particularized and is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. 2 1.1.1. The actual or threatened injury required by art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, 3 the invasion of which creates standing. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 3, § 1 et seq. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct. 2197 4 (U.S.N.Y.,1975) 5 1.1.2. Injury includes “an invasion of a legally protected interest”. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 6 S.Ct. 1055 (U.S.Ariz.,1997) 7 1.1.3. Ordinarily, litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on legal 8 rights or interests of third parties, even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects litigant also 9 affects third party. U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S.Ct. 1428 (U.S.W.Va. 1990) 10 1.1.4. Economic injury is not the only kind of injury that can support a plaintiff's constitutional standing to bring 11 suit. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555 (U.S.Ill.,1977) 12 1.2. Causation. The injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. 13 1.3. Redressability. It is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 14 decision by the court. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. 15 1.3.1. Redress or remedy may be specified in a statute. 16 1.3.2. Redress or remedy may be specified in a contract or franchise that binds the parties to the suit. 17 1.3.3. If no statute authorizing redress can be identified, authority to grant redress may be demonstrated by 18 identifying a prior similar case in which redress was afforded by the court. 19 2. In personam jurisdiction over both parties. This is established by one or more of the following: 20 2.1. Service of summons upon the party WITHIN the district the court services. OR 21 2.2. A voluntary “appearance” within that court. 22

“The plaintiff in error insists that the Pennsylvania court had no jurisdiction to proceed against it; consequently the judgment it rendered was void for the want of the due process of law required by the 14th Amendment. If the defendant had no such actual, legal notice of the Pennsylvania suit as would bring it into court, or if it did not voluntarily appear therein by an authorized representative, then the Pennsylvania court was without jurisdiction , and the conclusion just stated would follow, even if the judgment would be deemed

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conclusive in the courts of that commonwealth.

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[Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907)]

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3. One of the following two types of jurisdiction: 30 3.1. Territorial jurisdiction in cases in which the common law is invoked. The injury or damaged property must have 31 been physically located within the territory serviced by the court. 32

" Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 , 29 S.Sup.Ct. 511, 16 Ann.

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Cas. 1047 . “

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[Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918)]

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The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial.' Ex parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499; People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 590, 596. Words having universal scope, such as 'every contract in restraint of trade,' 'every person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken, as a matter of course, to mean only everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch. In the case of the present statute, the improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to sue. We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned. Other objections of a serious nature are urged, but

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need not be discussed.

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[American Banana Co. v. U.S. Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 at 357-358]

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“In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,12 we had occasion to refer to the 'canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States * * * .' That presumption, far from being overcome here, is doubly fortified by

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the language of this statute and the legislative purpose underlying it. “

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[U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 at 222 (1949)]

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3.2. Subject matter jurisdiction over the subject of the suit granted by statute. For instance, if the court is a federal 54 court and the matter involves state domiciled parties not present on federal territory, a “federal question” must be 55 involved which attaches to federal property of some kind, such as federal territory, federal franchises, diversity of 56 citizenship, or domiciliaries of the federal zone. 57

Requirement for Consent

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Copyright Sovereignty Education and Defense Ministry, http://sedm.org Form 05.003, Rev. 7-23-2013

EXHIBIT:________