Law of Consent (1 of 1)

In Ogden v. Saunders, which teas before this court in 1827, Mr. Justice Thompson, referring to the clauses of the Constitution prohibiting the State from passing a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, said: 'Neither provision can strictly be considered as introducing any new principle, but only for greater security and safety to incorporate into this charter provisions admitted by all to be among the first principles of our government. No State court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law, if no such prohibition teas contained in the Constitution of the United States: so, neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced. Such laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles upon which every just system of laws is founded.' In the Federalist. Mr. Madison declared that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to even' principle of sound legislation: and in the Dartmouth College Case Mr. Webster contended that acts, which were there held to impair the obligation of contracts, were not the exercise of a power properly legislative. [99 U.S. 700. 7661 as their object and e f fect was to take away vested rights. 'To instil►' the taking meav of vested rights.' he said, 'there must be a forfeiture, to adiudge upon and declare which is the proper province of the iudiciam' Surely the Constitution would have failed to establish iustice had it allowed the exercise of such a dangerous power to the Congress of the United States. In the second place, legislation impairing the obligation of contracts impinges upon the provision of the Constitution which declares that no one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law: and that means by law in its regular course of administration through the courts ofjustice. Contracts are property, and a large portion of the wealth of the country exists in that form. Whatever impairs their value diminishes,, therefore, the property of the owner; and if that be effected by direct legislative action operating upon the contract. forbidding its enforcement or transfer, or otherwise restricting its use, the owner is as much deprived of his property without due process of law as if the contract were impounded, or the value it represents were in terms wholly or partially confiscated. [Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878)]

Examples of statutory franchise statuses we cannot be compelled to accept or assume the obligations of absent consent include: 1. "taxpayer" or "employer" under the Internal Revenue Code Subtitle A "trade or business" franchise.

2. "spouse" under the family code of your state. 3. "driver" under the vehicle code of your state. 4. "citizen" or "resident" under the civil statutory law of your state.

Because we have an unalienable right of freedom from compelled association under the First Amendment and a right NOT to be compelled to contract with any government, then it stands to reason that NO ONE can either associate a status with you that you do not expressly consent to or impose the obligations of any legal status upon you without your express consent in some form. The minute they either threaten you to declare any status on a government form you don't consent to or instigate any kind of coercion or intimidation in connecting you with a specific statutory civil status is the minute that they are: 1. Tampering with a witness in criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. §1512, because all government forms signed under penalty of perjury constitute the testimony of a witness. 2. Violating constitutional rights, if they are acting as an officer of any government such as a statutory "withholding agent" under 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(16). 3. Engaging in a constitutional tort. 4. Compelling you to contract. 5. Engaging in identity theft, by using your identity for commercial purposes without your express consent.

When people exercise their sovereign right to contract, they usually reduce their agreement to a writing signed by the parties to the agreement. The presence of their signature on the contract constitutes "prima facie evidence" of their consent.

"Prima facie. Lat. At first sight; on the first appearance; on the face of it; so far as can be judged from the first disclosure; presumably: a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary. State ex rel. Herbert v. Whims, 68 Ohio App. 39, 28 N,E.2d. 596, 599, 21 O.O. 110. See also Presumption"

[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1189]

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Requirement for Consent