KFLCC Kingdom Law 2nd Ed.

1092

SKELETON BILL

SLOUGH

SKELETON BILL. One drawn, indorsed, or accepted in blank. SKILL. Practical and familiar knowledge of the principles and processes of an art, science, or trade, combined with the ability to apply them in practice in a proper and approved manner and with readiness and dexterity. See Dole v. Johnson, 50 N. H. 454; Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78; Graham v. Gautier, 21 Tex. 119; Haworth v. Severs Mfg. Co., 87 Iowa, 765, 51 N. W. 68. —Reasonable skill. Such skill as is ordi narily possessed and exercised by persons of common capacity, engaged in the same business or employment. Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 26.—Skilled witnesses. Witnesses who are allowed to give evidence on matters of opinion and abstract fact. SLADE. In old records. A long, flat, and narrow piece or strip of ground. Paroch. Antiq. 465. SLAINS. See LETTERS OF SLAINS. SLANDER. In torts. Oral defamation; the speaking of false and malicious words concerning another, whereby injury results to his reputation. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 227, 23 L. Ed. 308; Fredrickson v. Johnson, 60 Minn. 337, 62 N. W. 388; Ross v. Ward, 14 S. D. 240, 85 N. W. 182, 86 Am. St. Rep. 746; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 Ati. 730, 52 L. R. A. 87, 86 Am. St. Rep. 414; Republican Pub. Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399, 24 Pac. 1051; Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 3837. —Slander of title. This is a statement of something tending to cut down the extent of title to some estate vested in the plaintiff. Such statement, in order to be actionable, must be false and malicious; i. e., both untrue and done on purpose to injure the plaintiff. Dam age must also have resulted from the state ment. Brown. See Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532, 27 Pac. 527, 13 L. R. A. 707, 25 Am. St. Rep. 151; Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 Pac. 781; Butts v. Long, 94 Mo. App. 687, 68 S. W. 754. SLANDERER. One who maliciously and without reason imputes a crime or fault to another of which he is innocent. See SEN DER. SLAVE. A person who is wholly subject to the will of another; one who has no free dom of action, but whose person and serv ices are wholly under the control of another. Webster. One who is under the power of a master, and who belongs to him; so that the master may sell and dispose of his person, of his in dustry, and of his labor, without his being able to do anything, have anything, or ac quire anything, but what must belong to his master. Civ. Code La. art. 35. SLAVE-TRADE. The traffic in slaves, or the buying and selling of slaves for profit.

SLAVERY. The condition of a slave; that civil relation in which one man has ab solute power over the life, fortune, and lib* erty of another. SLAY. This word, in an indictment, adds nothing to the force and effect* of the wor4 "kill," when used with reference to the tak ing of human life. It is particularly appli cable to the taking of human life in battle; and, when it is not used in this sense, it is synonymous with "kill." State v. Thomas, 82 La. Ann. 351. SLEDGE. A hurdle to draw traitors to execution. 1 Hale, P. CL 82. SLEEPING PARTNER. A dormant part ner; one whose name does not appear in the firm, and who takes no active part in the business, but who has an interest in the con cern, and shares the profits, and thereby be comes a partner, either absolutely, or as re spects third persons. SLEEPING RENT. In English law. An expression frequently used in coal-mine leases and agreements for the same. It signifies a fixed or dead, «. e., certain, rent, as distin guished from a rent or royalty varying wita the amount of coals gotten, and is payable although the mine should not be worked at all, but should be sleeping or dead, whence the name. Brown. SLIGHT. As to slight "Care," "Evidence,' , "Fault," and "Negligence," see those titles. SLIP. 1. In negotiations for a policy of insurance. In England, the agreement is in practice concluded between the parties by a memorandum called the "slip," containing the terms of the proposed insurance, and in itialed by the underwriters. Sweet. 2. Also that part of a police court which is divided off from the other parts of the court, for the prisoner to stand in. It is frequently called the "dock." Brown. 3. The intermediate space between two wharves or docks; the opening or vacant space between two piers. See Thompson v. New Tork, 11 N. Y. 120; New York T. Scott, 1 Caines (N. Y.) 543. SLIPPA. A stirrup. There is a tenure of land in Cambridgeshire by holding the sovereign's stirrup. Wharton. SLOUGH. An arm of a river, flowing be tween islands and the main-land, and sep arating the islands from one another. Sloughs have not the breadth of the main river, nor does the main body of water of the stream flow through them. Dunlieth & D. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque County, 55 Iowa, 565* 8 N. W. 443.